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Abstract: The Gulf of Aden represents a strategic issue for the international community, as its 
geographical position is fundamental as the major trade maritime route. About 50 percent of the world 
container ships pass through the Gulf of Aden each year, 80 percent of those cargos coming from 
Europe. For this reason, the piracy issue affecting Somalia is a problem affecting EU member states’ 
security and economy. This paper is focused on the comprehensive approach acted by the European 
Union, with a special attention on proposing the implementation of programs against illegal fishing 
and waste dumping in order to fight Somali piracy. The evaluation of the military mission offers an 
overview on a solution for the near future, while the training missions and the development funds 
sustain the build-up of national tools and focus on the solving of the roots of the issue. 
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1. Introduction 
The Gulf of Aden is a strategic geographical area for the international community, 
due to its position at the core of great maritime trade routes. Through these waters 
sail up to 50 percent of the world’s container ships (Holzer, 2012), with an average 
amount of 28,000 crossing the Gulf annually (Djama, 2011). Over 80 percent of 
this trade comes back and forth from Europe. This is one of the many reasons that 
took the European Union, along with the United Nations, the African Union and 
single States as China, Russia or the United States, to pragmatically care about the 
problem of Somali piracy.  
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Piracy is addressed as a security issue by the actors involved in the operations off 
the coasts of Somalia. Following the predominant interpretation, in the 
international response narrative the piracy issue involves discourses based on the 
global war on terror (Wolff, 2013, p. 25). Even if a formal correlation between 
pirates and the extremist group al-Shabbab operating in the area has not been 
proven yet, the fear that the lucrative already present traffic of weapons can set the 
rules for a collaboration is high. The instability of the region is itself a possible 
source of haven for criminal organisations. Besides that point, the international 
community has a great economic interest in preventing piracy: ransoms to be paid 
to pirates for the freeing of the vessels amounted until a maximum of $3.5m for a 
Ukrainian ship carrying Russian tanks (Osei-Tutu, 2013, p. 3). To that, costs for the 
maintain of private security companies on board to prevent the hijacking must be 
added, without forgetting that changing the current route and passing by Cape of 
Good Hope costs, for example for an American vessel, an average of $3.5 million 
more annually for the additional fuel (US Department of Transportation 2009). 
However, in this paper, the focus of the analysis is, in particular, on the 
comprehensive approach acted by the European Union, with a special attention on 
proposing the implementation of programs against illegal fishing and waste 
dumping to fight the Somali piracy narrative based on the picture of them as being 
guardians of the seas.  
 
2. Context of Somali Piracy Birth 
The roots of the spread of piracy in Somalia date back to the beginning of the 90s, 
after the collapse of Siad Barre’s government in 1991 (Schbley, 2013). After the 
disintegration of the state institutions, it followed a period of economic crisis, while 
tense internal conflict kept going on during the following years involving different 
clans independently controlling portions of the Somali territory. In this situation of 
lack of state effectiveness and credibility, the political authority ceased to provide 
for positive public goods to the population, such as the fulfil of basic needs and 
personal security (Osei-Tutu, 2013), resulting in a demanding humanitarian 
disaster, with almost 4 millions of people in need for food provisions (Holzer, 
2012, p. 3).  
The political internal confusion took the lead for other consequential problems, 
which, in this perspective, are not causes of the instability of the authority, but are 
indeed a result from it. This said, Somalia, as a failed state, became a natural 
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collector of negative behaviours impacting on its success to recover from the 
situation in which it fell. The connection between a weak or non-existent state and 
poverty has been proven as source of the upraise of the phenomenon of piracy 
(Wilson, 2009). The still on-going chaotic situation on the Somali territory, even if 
partially attenuated after the election of the new Federal Government of Somalia in 
2012, offers the hint for several papers on the subject.  
However, a question should be raised in relation to the new developments, after 
evaluating the current operational system already mise en place. There is a need to 
make an overview on the discourses claimed by Somali people to be at the roots of 
the piracy narrative and to analyse the action on the part of the European Union to 
fight internally the problem, emptying of meaning that legitimacy that has been 
postulated. 
 
3. Somali Piracy Narrative  
In the early 90s, taking advantages of the loss of control on the territory by the 
state, foreign vessels increased significantly their illegal presence and activity in 
the waters in front of the Somali coastline, moreover greatly profiting by the 
absence of a defined Exclusive Economic Zone under the Law of the Sea dictates. 
This rising problem was directly related to the anarchical political condition, where 
the crumbling down of the central authority left gaps in almost every field of state 
prerogative. Somali fishing grounds remained unprotected and vessels from foreign 
countries, like China, Japan, South Korea, easily started to profit from that 
ungoverned area. Besides, some European ships participated too to the 
pauperization of fish stocks, flying other convenient flags to skip the restrictions 
the European Union has on the subject.  
Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing is commonly favoured in zones 
where sea policing and patrolling by the government is absent, for lack of will or 
means, and it impacts negatively not only on the direct revenues of the coastal state 
but also on the chain of production associated with the wider fishery industry: “The 
affected coastal state loses revenue that could have been accrued in the form of 
landing fees, licence fees, taxes and other levies which are payable by legal fishing 
operators. Other indirect impacts include the loss of income and employment in 
other industries and activities in the supply chain upstream and downstream from 
the fishing operation itself” (Hughes, 2011, p. 2).  
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The UN Food and Agriculture Organisation reported that around 700 foreign 
vessels were suspected to practise illegal fishing in Somali waters. On the other 
side, the 2005 tsunami brought light on the phenomenon of toxic waste dumping, 
including radioactive material, by Italian and Swiss companies during the years of 
Barre’s government collapse. In this context, many Somali ex-fishermen claimed to 
have become pirates in order to re-establish what was felt as fairness, as a response 
to foreign depredation of their sovereignty and resources (Schbley, 2013, p. 6). The 
so called “moral economy of piracy” (Marchal, 2011) started with a demand of a 
sort of tax taken acting as substitute of the state role, quickly increasing into a 
highly remunerated and broadly criminal activity in the need of finding an answer 
to unemployment and lack of food in an unsecure economic background. 
This narrative has found its follow also in the official context of some international 
organisations dealing with the Somali issue. For example, practises of illegal 
fishing and toxic waste dumping had been reported as root causes of piracy by a 
Somali government official during a May 2010 informal United Nations General 
Assembly meeting on piracy (UN 2010). Moreover, in 2005 a World Bank report 
highlighted the direct connection between over-fishing and poverty, which leads to 
the consideration of piracy as a socio-political problem linked to the need of 
Somali people to find an economic source of survival (Hughes, 2011, p. 1).  
 
4. EU Current Approach  
This issue is affecting in a profound way the European and international economy. 
Therefore, until today EU has developed a comprehensive approach regarding the 
situation in Somalia. On one side, the European Union Council adopted the Joint 
Action 2008/851/CFSP for the deployment of a military operation. The European 
Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) Somalia – Operation Atalanta has been 
launched in 2008 and its mandate was extended in 2012 until the end of 2014. On 
the other side, the Council adopted the decision 2011/819/CFSP for the deployment 
of EUCAP NESTOR – a regional capacity building mission aimed to enhance the 
maritime security and governance of three to five countries in Horn of Africa. At 
the same time, a training mission (EUTM Somalia) is provided by EU for military 
training to members of the Somali National Armed Force (Council Decision 
2010/96/CFSP).  
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The military operation has two components. The first one consists of deployments 
of military capabilities as warships and surveillance planes. The second is 
represented by a web-based platform that has the aim to monitor registered vessels 
passing through the Gold of Aden, called the Maritime Security Centre: Horn of 
Africa (MSCHOA). The costs of the operation are supported by the member states 
and went from €8.4 million in 2010 to €8.05 million in 2011, €8.3 million in 2012 
and 14.9 million until the end of 2014 (Maritime Security Centre of Africa 2014). 
19 countries of the European Union and two third countries (Croatia and Norway) 
are participating with personnel and capabilities, as well as Serbia, Montenegro and 
Ukraine, who provided officers for headquarters (EU NAVFOR Somalia 2014). 
The necessity of a comprehensive approach in the case of Somali piracy is 
determined by the fact that a military mission in Somalia’s waters is only a short-
term solution: it guarantees more safety to the ships while it is available, but when 
the mission ends the situation could return to its initial stage. A comprehensive 
approach offers the prospect to engage different tools which gives the possibility to 
fix the causes of the problem and to strengthen the country’s tools required to fight 
the problem. In the Somali case, the training mission puts into practice the saying 
“Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day; teach a man to fish and you feed 
him for a lifetime”. The training mission and the capacity building mission are 
explained as a long-term solution to the piracy issue by Zwolski and Kaunert 
(Zwolski & Kaunert, 2012, p. 7). 
The EUCAP NESTOR mission has a budget on €12 million (2013-2014) and is 
supported by 16 member countries, as well as Norway. The mission is focused on 
training coastal police forces and judges involved in the maritime security (EU 
Committee – Third Report 2012: par.58). 
The EUTM Somalia mission aims solely the soldiers, their number rising to 3600 
since 2010 (EEAS 2013: EUTM Somalia). However, only in 2014 the training was 
set in Somalia. At the beginning, the Somali National Armed Forces were trained 
in Uganda due to the political instability of the first country, in collaboration with 
the Uganda People’s Defence Forces. The mandate of this mission has been 
extended until 2015 on the 22th of January 2013 on the 3215th EU Council 
meeting and has an additional budget of € 11.6 million. 
At the same time, the European Commission has allocated €212 million under the 
10th European Development Fund to support reforms in education, governance, for 
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economic development and food security for the period 2008-2013 (Joint Strategy 
Paper for Somalia 2008: 34). In 2011 €200 million were added to the process.  
 
4.1. Policies’ Evaluation 
The evaluation of the EU policies regarding Somali piracy shows positive results. 
The number of pirate attacks in Somalia’s waters has decreased by 40% since 
2011. The International Chamber of Commerce showed that only 15 incidents were 
reported in 2013, compared to 75 in 2012 and 237 in 2011 (The ICC Commercial 
Crime Service 2014). However, it is difficult to evaluate how much of these results 
is determined by EU’s platform and presence in the region because simultaneously 
NATO and a Combined Task Force (a coalition committed to ensure regional 
maritime security including countries like Bahrain, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, 
Singapore, Turkey, United States etc.) have deployed naval missions too. Still, the 
web-platform put in place by the EU is highly used and exceeded the initial 
expectations. During a reunion within the House of Lords, Rear Admiral Philip 
Jones declared that the MSCHOA platform “has been one of the unexpected and 
very significant successes of the operation, where almost all of the shipping 
companies that transit through the Gulf of Aden register with this website and give 
us information about their transiting ships” (House of Lords, 2010, p. 3). 
Likewise, a report presented in 2012 shows that the training mission “has produced 
useful results and should be continued” (EU Committee – Third Report 2012: par. 
60). EUCAP NESTOR improved the capabilities of the coastal states and was 
evaluated as being a suitable long-term solution for the piracy issue because it 
offers to the state the possibility to develop individual security tools. The EU 
evaluation Committee stressed that the training mission is expected to be “one of 
the most significant developments in combating piracy from the land. It should be 
built up to strength as soon as possible and supported in its development. EUCAP 
Nestor could and should be the gateway to a permanent solution to Somali piracy” 
(EU Committee – Third Report 2012: par. 61). A similar assessment was drawn on 
the case of EUTM Somalia mission. 
From an internal point of view, the EU’s antidumping and illegal fishing 
regulations are vital to the resolution of the problem because they deal with part of 
the cause. However, their effectiveness is to be assed in the future since the 
projects are only at the beginning. 
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4.2. Suggestions 
Until today, the international community approach has been mainly shaped by 
ideologies of traditional security. However, if we take into account the 
constructivist theory and we admit that discourses shape reality, in our opinion the 
European Union could implement in its politics some devices in order to empty of 
meaning Somali the main piracy narrative, increasing its legitimacy at the eyes of 
Somali people. Those would be support operations that could work 
comprehensively with the other military and civil programs already in place to 
fight the extreme underdevelopment, poverty and lack of strong institutions in 
Somalia. The major challenge for the Somali government is to develop tools that 
would allow a national control over the piracy issue. Training missions offer this 
possibility and should be continued until a certain level of preparedness is achieved 
for the personnel working in the maritime security domain.  
At the same time, an efficient control system nowadays requires a certain 
technological level that Somalia does not have. The funding by the EU of new 
equipment for the supervision of fishing boats and border control, on the model of 
the ones adopted by EU itself, as well as policing and securing the shoreline would 
strengthen the state presence in the territory and simultaneously decrease the IUU 
fishing, waste dumping and piracy attempts.  
The goal is to broadly demonstrate to be willing to go deeper into the piracy 
problem, answering to the recrimination that the Somali people is sending about 
the foreign negative interference we talked about previously. On its side, the 
European Union has already a set of policies suitable to combat against the IUU 
fishing (European Commission 2009), also involving the promotion of the Vessel 
Monitoring System, a compulsory technology for the EU ships above 12m that 
provides data to fisheries authorities about the location, course and speed of the 
vessels (European Commission 2011).  
Moreover, the European External Action Service finances a platform for regional 
cooperation in the field of fishery, the Indian Ocean Commission (EEAS 2013: 
Indian Ocean Commission), where five States of the area share their knowledge 
and information in order to better achieve a strong control over maritime illegal 
activities: “The IOC’s principal mission is to strengthen the ties of friendship 
between the countries and be a platform of solidarity for the entire population of 
the Indian-oceanic region. Its mission also includes development, through projects 
related to sustainability for the region, aimed at protecting the region, improving 
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living conditions of the populations and preserving the very natural resources that 
the countries depend on”. A suggestion would be for Somalia to join in the project, 
although at the moment the IOC has only island member states. This would give 
the country its own tools and a place where making its assessments be heard and 
collected in an official context. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The recent developments at the international level, economically and 
environmentally, have deeply touched the situation of the Somali state. There is a 
state of poverty enhanced by local issues and an added value determined by the 
involvement of external actors as new fishing players or waste dumping 
companies. At the same time, the relevance of this geographical area has increased 
lately. The trade taking place in the Indian Ocean and the Aden Gulf offered 
opportunities to the old players. 
The tackling of the piracy is therefore not simple. Different countries and 
organisations have tried to get involved through the deployment of military vessels. 
Although this approach has improved the situation, the problem itself is not only 
related to the combative aspect. As a consequence, the EU institutions opted for a 
comprehensive approach. This choice implies not only the development of a 
platform to monitor the vessels travelling in this area or the stationing of boats to 
prevent the takeover of cargos by pirates, but also providing institutional and 
financial help to the Somali government with the aim of strengthening their judicial 
system and their border protection personnel. The assistance provided through the 
European Development Fund is a long-term solution that can offer a choice to the 
future generation. By supporting the economic and the educational system, this 
approach provides further professional options for the local population decreasing 
the possibility for a choice of piracy. 
However, the European countries should consider as well the role of the EU 
internal problems on its neighbours. There is a need to tackle the waste dumping 
issue because an ineffective policy at the EU level on this matter can have a 
considerable impact on countries as Somalia. And this is not only a problem that is 
transferred elsewhere, it is also a danger for the environment of an entire region.  
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